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Clinical Judgment as a Function of
Manifest Anxiety and Social Conditions
Joseph F. Pribyl
Loyola University, Chicago
listerical lackgrqyn4.

Becau.e experienced clinicians so frequently

are required to make diagnoses with little information and little time,
the feeling has developed that clinical judgment was an intuitive process.
This feeling brought with it the implication that clinical judgment had a
mystical quality that made it unapproachable by ordinary scientific means.
Coing against this tradition. Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960) produced a
clinical judgment model based on the processes of syllogistic reasoning.
There are several stages in the process of clinical judgment according to
their analysis; namely, the development of a postulate system in the person
doing the judging, the eduction of premises, the establishment of cues and
their use to instantiate the object, and the drawing of conclusions from
the instantiation in terms of the predicate of the major premise (Serbin
et al., 1960, p. 20).

Taking another approach, Hoffman (1960) adopted a

mathematical model based on information theory.

Both of these approaches

present difficulties that hinder fruitful research.

Sarbin!!

Al.,

have

given a good rational analysie of clinical judgment, but they have not
given much in the way of testable hypotheses (Hunt" Jones, 1962).

While

hypotheses are forthcoming from Hoffman's mathematical model, they are not
presently testable because available analyses of clinical judgment have
not identified with sufficient precision the cues or inputs that are
1

2

pertinent to an information theory model.
An

earlier attempt by Meehl (1954) seems to offer a somewhat more

hopeful approach.

He

considers the processes involved in clinical

judpent as analogous to those involved in actuarial prediction.

Meehl

suggests that making statistical predictions on the basis of actuarial
tables is a more exact way of dOing much of what a clinician does in making
intuitive decisions.

the clinician has a finite number of facts that he

puts together in different combinations of tmportance to make predictions.
He

also possesses a series of "rules of thumbtt that he uses in making

decisions.

The operations that a clinician goes through in making a

decision based on a set of facts can be done by a clerical worker, a
calculator, and actuarial tables.

!be actuarial method is likely to be

more accurate in predicting because the method assigns the weights that
are opttmal for best predictions to the different facts.

While Meehl

favors the use of the superior actuarial method and its high predictive
value, he realizes that even if vast actuarial tables and techniques were
available they could not replace the clinician in the creative act of
making a hypothesis.

Hunt and Jones (1962) state that the actuarial

method is theoretically the best method of clinicQI diagnosis; but they
realize that at the present time the actuarial method is not the answer
to the problems of clinical diagnusis.

Preventing ihe fulfillment of the

actuarial method's promise of accuracy is the fact that the actuarial
approach is useful only in areas where refined tests are available.

the

actuarial approach is also hampered by public opinion, which objects to
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the use of machines in making judgments about men.
RAvalgpmcnt £i.tho Psy,hophysical ISgdel.

Because of these difficulties,

Hunt (1959) feels that the presently used clinical methods should be
improved through research.

One cf the difficulties encountered in doing

research on clinical judgment is that any given judgment is based on a
unique set of facts that cannot be reproduced.

Underwood (1957) points

out that one of the requirements for scientific investigation is a reliable
phenomenon.

!he kind of clinical judgment that occurs in daily clinical

practice would seem to lack this prerequisite of reliability and thus not
be amenable to scientific study.
clinician making repeated clinical

Bunt (1959) suggests that if the
jud~nts

were made the focus of

clinical research, clinical judgment could be made the subject of scientific investigation.
Ivery clinical judgment has its unique aspects, but each also shares
certain commonalities with other judgments, particularly those made by the
same judge.

!hese commonalities can be the subject of rigorous scientific

investigation as the determinants of individual judgments by a single
clinician.

By the same token. the variables that influence agreement among

several judges can be studied by comparing judgmental performance in
identical, or at least similar, situations.

!his concept of interjudge

agreement forms the basis for much of Huntts work.
Hunt (1959) has suggested that the situation in which several
clinicians are asked to make repeated judgments on the same clinical
material is analagous to the paradigm of classical psychophysics.

In his

4
work Runt uses the method of sinzle
rated along some scale.

~timuli

by having clinical material

It is hoped that clinical judgment can be shown to

be one of .evera! phenomena. embodied within the general eat_aory of judgment.
If this 1s true, then much of

t~~ literatl~e

pertaining to psychophysical

judgment can he broueht. to bear on the problem of cUnical judgment.

In the context of the psychophysical model, Hunt and Arnhoff (1956)
have d_onstrated that clinical juclgment is reliable as measured by interjudge agreement.

Other workers (Campbell. Kunt 7 6: Lewis, 1957. Campbell,

Lewis, and Hunt. 1958) have shown that the context effects well known to

classical psychophysics (Beebe.(enter, 1929; Helson. 1947; Hunt, 1941; Bunt
1& Volkmann, 1937~ and Johnson, 1955) are also found in clinical judgment.

In eIas.ieal psychophysic.) variables that are lOlically related to
the field of learning have been shown to affect judpent.
1948) haa shown that the
changes the

18'

Is'

Kelson (1947 t

previous aCCluaintance with s1ailar stimuli

adaptat:f.on level (a phenomenon in which perception of

previous stitm.lli will influence perception of subsequent stimuli.).

It

would .... thatexperienced clinicians should be better able to make
clinical judpents than naive judges .ince they have had experience with
a wider range of stimuli.
1&

Several investigators (Cria, 1958, aunt, Jones,

aunt, 1957; Jones, 1957; Cline, 1955) have confirmed the above.

"a,nlna lMoD'.IW! JuS.nt;. In efforts to relate clinical judgment
to other areas of paychology. HUGt and his co-workers have begun to
investigate the relationship betueen clinical judgment and learning theory.
In doing this llunt and Jones (1962) hope that clinical judament will become
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lucre firmly anchored in experimental psyehology.

Gibson (1953) reviewed

many studies showing that absolute judgments made with the method of sinale
stiIauli improve when there is only practice but no correction or knowledge
of results.

Ammons (1955)

r~v1ewed eJ~rtments

dealing with different

types of judgments and perceptual-motor performances and concluded that
learning is faster and reaches a higher level with knowledge of results and
that the more specific the knowled&e the roore the rapid the improvement.
In consideration of the above evidence Blumberg (1961) predicted that (a>
practice in making clinical judgments with no knowledge of results would
lead to more rapid, reliable, and valid judsmentsi (b) even more rapid,
reliable, and accurate clinical judgments would result if the judge were
given specific knowledge of the correct judgmental responses; (c) clinical
judgments of an intermediate degree of rapidity, reliability, and validity
would result if only general feedback were given to tile judges; and (d)
there would be transfer of training (greater rapidity, reliability, and
validity of judgments) when new stimuli were judged.

Having §.S rate the

vocabulary responses from hospitalized schizophrenics on a 7-point scale
of exhibited disorganization, Blumbers found that the three conditions made
no difference in the rapidity of the judgments, and that hypothesis (4)
above was not supported in that the reliability and the validity of the
clinical judgments did not improve when the judges received only practice
and no feedback, but the reliability and validity of the clinical judsmenta
did improve when the judges received the general and specific feedback as
predicted in hypotheses (b) and (c) above.

'!'be hypothesis that there
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would be transfer of training in all three conditions was not supported in
that transfer was found only in the condition in which the judges received
specific feedback.
One of the more vigorous areas of research in the field of learning
has been the concept of drive as measured by anxiety scales (Sarason, 1960).
Taylor (1951, 1953, 1956) developed the first arud.ety aeale to receive wid.apread attention.

Taylor's Manifest Anxiety Seale (hereafter referred to

as HAS) was originally designated as an operational measure of Bull's drive
in an eyelid conditioning experiment (Taylor, 1951).

Taylor developed the

Bul1ian based hypothesis that different sources of drive summate in!s to
produce a total effective drive state (D) that sets the strength of the
conditioned eyelid response.

Taylor assumed that different levels of

psychiatrically defined "manifest anxiety" would be indicative of different
levels of generalized drive.

She obtained 65 true-false items which 80

percent of a group of clinical staff members chose as being indicative of
manifest anxiety as it was operationally defined.

!he 65 selected items

were part of a group of 200 lIMP! it.... that the clinicians judged.

'l'he

original MAS iteas were mixed in with 135 MMPI items not related to anxiety.
Taylor's original scale was later (1953) cut to 50 it... that showed
the laiaheat correlation with the total score, and these 50 items were

mixed with the L, K, and r scales of the HMPI and MMPI items scored on
Wesley's rigidity scale. !he final scale numbered 225 items and has been
called the Biographical Inventory.
Taylor (1951) found that high anxious!s (is scoring high on the MAS)
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were consistently superior to low arudous ls (!s scoring low on the HAS) in
the amount of eyelid conditioning (bereafter high anxious Is will be
referred to as HA and low anxious Is as LA).
significant.

The results were statistically

An attempt, through two sets of differential instructions

after 20 eyelid conditioning trials, to induee experimentally differing
levels of stress in the
differenees.

I.

failed to produce any statistically significant

Taylor interpreted the differential eyelid conditioning

obtained for the two groups of ls selected on the basts of their HAS scores
as meaning that the drive level of the HA Is was hiaber than that of the
LA. Is and henee that the growth curves of the excitatory potentials for the

two groups of Is were different.

Taylor also suggested that on the basis

of Bullts (1943) postulate that the growth of excitatory potential was
dependent upon both habit strength (B) and drive (0), the d:l.fferenee in
the growth curves of excitatory potential in the two groups (inferred from
differences in the conditioning curves) might be due to chanaes in both 0
and H.

In such a ease, the SA 1s would react 1IlOl"e strongly to the uncon-

ditioned sttmu1us tmplying that the same physical sttmulus had a different
psychological value for the HA

Is

and LA ls.

Taking into consideration

Bull's (1943) postulate that reward partially determines H, the termination
of the uncond:l.tioned sttmulus should produce a greater reduction of 0 in
the BA 18. and, therefore t increase K.
While higher drive level (inferred from higher HAS score.) should lead
to better performance in a situation where there is only one habit evoked,

the predictions for tasks in which there are several available habits having
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differing levels of availability are more complex.

taylor (1956) suggested

that in a complex task two other Hullian (1943) concepts must be used.
!bey are oscillatory inhibition (0) and threshold (L).
characteristics are attributed to 0:

!he follOWing

(a) 0 varies from moment to moment

such that the distribution of 0 for a group of individuals on the same
response at any moment would be approximately normal; (b) 0 plays an inhibi·
tory role, subtracting from excitatory potential and thus giving rise to
momentary excitatory potential.

Por a given response to occur, the momentary

excitatory potential must be higher than the threshold value (L) for that
response.

It is assumed that the value of t is the same for like habit

tendencies evoked in a particular situation.

In a task where several

response tendencies are available in competition, the one that will take
place is the one with highest momentary excitatory potential.

Keeping in

mind the postulate that excitatory potential is dependent upon habit
strength, other things being equal, the response tendency with the greatest
B and therefore the greatest excitatory potential has the greatest
bility of taking place.

prOba~

Adding the conception of D as affecting excitatory

potential, when the desired response is weaker (lower R) than one or more
competing response tendency, tlle 1s with higher D will perform less well
than !s with lower D.

One further possibility exists in that responses

having very weak habit strengths may gain enough excitatory potential to
be above threshold, thus reducing the probability of the correct response
in the high D Is.

In the case where the correct response is maximally

available t heightened drive would make performance superior for high drive 1s.
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While Blumberg (196l) had established dtat learning (improvement in
reliability and validity) did take place when is had general and specific
feedback, there were indications that different kinds of learning took place
even with no feedback.

For example, rating the same stimuli (schizophrenics'

vocabulary test responses) over six trials reduced the latencies over trials
of the

es'

judgments even with no feedback.

another study (Hunt and Blumberg, 1961).
learning their own

jud~wntal

This finding was replicated in

If nothing else, the is were

responses better.

A:rud.ety.!..W! Clinical Judent.

The question arose as to just tmen a

subject, in making repeated judgments, is judging evaluatively and when he
is simply repeating previous responses.

'!'he assumed parallel to the l' s

el:.perimental judging is that of a clinical situation in which a practicing
clinician gets faster and faster in making clinical evaluations.

When does

the clinician stop making clinical, judgmental evaluations and simply start
repeating previously

learl~

responses to relevant stimuli?

An attempt was

made to answer the above question for the is making experimental

jud~nts

by applying Taylor's drive theory to the task of repeated clinical judgments.
is who score high on the MAS should initially perform less well than Is who
score low on the MAS.

The difference in performance of high and low scorers

on the MAS should shrink with repeated jud1Jl18nts and they should perform
equally well.

According to drive theory (Taylor, 1956), those is scoring

higner on the HAS would have a greater response probability for competing
responses, thus making incorrec t responses more likely.

However) once the

high MAS scorers establish the correct response, they should perform with
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shorter latency than low MAS scorers.

l11e disorganizationsl cU4S upon

which the rating of the schizophreuic·s test responses is based would provide
the cOft\peting response tendencies in the above formulation.

The paint at

which the performance curves for the high MAS scorers and low

~

scorers

would cross, as predicted by drive theory, would be the point at which
evaluative
began.

jud~nt

stopped and the elicitation of learned verbal responses

Runt and Blumberg (1961) had higb MAS scorers and low MAS scorers

rate 21 schizophrenics' vocabulary test responses on a '-point scale of
disorganization in different orders over sb: trials.

'l'be measures of

learning were latency, the number of shifts in judgment, reliability or
interjudge agreement, and validity as represented by the agreement of the
judge with the standardized values of the stimuli.
cated that learning took place.

All four measures indi-

Only the reliability and validity measures,

however, differentiated the high MAS scorers frQlll the low MAS scorers, with
the low MAS scorers being superior to the high MAS scorers on trial one and
the differences diminishing by the sixth trial.
~le

two groups of

'l'he perfort'l'l4nce curves of

Is did not cross) thus placing this particular application

of Taylor's drive theory itt doubt.
As a check on the results of the Hunt and Blumberg (1961)

study~

Runt

and Walker (1963) reanalyzed the data with a tr1al-by-trial analysis and
obtained a significant difference between the DA Is
first trial.

and. LA 1s only on the

Hunt and Walker also exactly replicated the Runt-Blumberg

study with a new set of subjects.

'l'he results paralleled the reanalysis of

the Hunt-Blumberg study except for what was probably a ehanee difference
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-

-

between the HA Ss and LA Ss on trial two.
To check the possibility that there were not enough trials to permit
the crossing of the performance curves of the HA and LA §,s J Hunt and Walker

(1963) did a second study utilizing 100 different standardized schizophrenic
test responses presented in 10 sets of 10 stimuli equated in range of
standardized stimulus values.

While the Hunt and Blumberg study (1961) and

Uunt and Walker's (1963) replication of it demonstrated that HA and LA

!8

were differentiated in performance on repeated judgments of the same stimuli,
the use of 100 different stimuli permitted the researchers to find out if
the performance differences of HA and LA !s would also be present if only a
general frame of reference was learned.

Htmt and walker' s second experiment

(1963) showed that only on the first set of 10 sttmuli did LA §,s perform
better than the ItA ,!s with the two groups of §.S being equally reliable on
hcause the results of three different

the remaining nine sets of stimuli.

studies did not support Taylor's (1956) drive theory in its prediction of
the crossing of the performance curves of the HA and LA §.s, Hunt and Walker
(1963) suggested that what Child describes as "irrelevant respor.ses made to

anxiety" (1954; P. 151.) were greater for !s who scored high on the MAS than
for

!s

who scored low on the MAS, and that the RA

1s

eliminated the task

irrelevant responses quickly, allowing their performance to come up to that
of the LA

.!s.

Soc,al Situatigll and Clinical

Judgment.

MBny of the clinical judpnt

studies done by Hunt and/or his co-workers dealt with subjects and experimenters in a one.. to-one relationship.

Walker, Hunt, and Schwartz (in press)

12
have integrated Child's (1954) interpretation that BA!s have more task

irrelevant responses with a discussion of the relation of stress and task
irrelevant responses presented

~y

Spence (lt63).

they applied their

integration to the comparison of 1s making clinical judgments in a co-acting,
non-interactina group and 1s making clinical judgments in an individual
(or one-to-one) situation.
Walker

~~.

(in press) had noted that there was apparent le••ening

of tension for !s in experiments on judgment if the 1s judged in a group
rather than individually.

Spence (1963) suggests that the 1ntens1ty of task

irrelevant responses is related to the amount of stress in an expertmental
s1tuation.

On the bas1s of the above. Walker

.!1.!1.

predicted that the

BA 1s would have a lowered or actual intensity of task irrelevant response.
relative to LA Is when both judged in a group situation.

Such a difference

between Is working in a group and individually was assumed to be due to the
existence of comparatively lea. stress in a group clinical juds-ent experiment as compared to a clinical judgment experiment in which there is a oneto-one relationship between the

I and the !.

In three independent experiments that utilized a group testing situation,
the

ab~

conclusions were supported (Walker et al., in press).

In two

experiments there were no signif1cant d1fferences between BA and LA!s over
many clinical judgments.

In the rema1ning experiment the BA 1s were

super10r to t't-.e LA 18 in early judgments but not 1n later ones.
Allport (1920, 1924) made clinical observations that appear to be in
contrast to those that Walker at ale (1n press) reported.

In ciescr1bing

13
the individual differences among the !s who worked in groups and relating
the individual differences to their experimental performances on nonjudgmental tasks, Allport remarked that some "nervous" 1s were not helped
by working in a group but were bindered.
measure of ttnervousness".

Allport did not have an objective

If what Allport called nervousness were assumed

to be a drive characteristic possessed by SA 18, it could be suggested that
SA is would have poorer judgmental ability in a group situation.

!his

paradox may be explained when one considers tbat Allport' s observations
about nervous individuals were JUde on is perform1ng non-judgmental tasks
and experimental group situations that many 18 described aa competitive.
In the experiments done by Walker e1 a1. the task was a judgmental
situation whicb would be unlikely to produce competition among the is.

!hue,

the variable of competition or no competition among !s might account for the
diaparate results.

In an unpublished study, Pribyl (1963) had two random groups of naive
Is rate SO schizophrenic vocabulary responses on a 7-point scale of disorganization.

One group was tested individually and. the other was tested in a

co-acting group.

The SO stimuli were presented in 5 sets 84uated in range

of atimuli used.

There was no significant difference between the two groupa

in reliability <aa represented by interjudge agreement) on the first three
seta of stimuli.

On the fourth and fifth sets of stimuli there was a drop

in reliability of the group judging individually J causing a significant
difference between the two groups on these trials.

two more random groups

were tested in exactly the same way with the addition of stress instructions
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that informed the

Is

that those who made less reliable ratings of the

stimuli were in need of psychological counseling.

'£he results for the two

stress groups paralleled that of the neutral group.

Stress instructions

had no significant effect on the Is receiving them.

A differential effect

had been hypothesized. the expectation being that stress instructions would
ntake" in an individual setting but not in a group aituation.

In the f01!'lll8r

stress instructions would produce a decrement in performance; in the latter
they would produce no difference in performance since these !s would not
believe that the instructions applied to all of them.
Perhaps some characteristic of the
differently from the

Is

! affected the la tested in groups

tested individually, or the greater stress assumed

by Walker et al. (in press) to be operating in the individual situation
heightened the effects of fatigue for Is tested individually.

It is also

fluite possible that the results obtained in this &tOOy were, in fact, a
chance finding.
Purpose.

The present experiment compared more accurately the differ-

ential effects of group versus individual testing of SA and LA 18 on a
clinical judgment task.

In view of previous research and theoretical

considerations, the following bypotheses are presented:
Hxpothes1s.Qn.t.

If BA judses and LA judges make many different

clinical judgments individually with only the .I present, the BA judges will
initially be less reliable than the LA judges, but eventually will become
just as reliable in their judgments as the LA judges.

In the individual

situation there will be sufficient stress as suggested by Walker et al. (in
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prass) to affect the HA and LA!s differentially such that the HA judges will
initially have stronger competing responses that will quickly be reduced to
allow the HA judges to perform just as well as the LA judges.
Itypothtds Two.

If HA judges and LA judges make many different clini-

cal judgments in a non-interacting group situation. the two groups of judges
will be equally reliable throughout the series of judgments.

this prediction

is based upon the assumption that there will be sufficiently reduced stress
in the group situation such that the HA judges and LA judges will have irrelevant competing responses of cDnlparable strength.
Hypothesis tlare!!_

The LA judges tested in the non-interacting

&TOUP

situation will initially be just as reliable as the LA judges in the individual situation.

After fllaking Mny clinical judgments the LA judges in the

individual situation will become less reliable than the LA judges in the
non-interacting group situation.

The baSis of this prediction is a frankly

empirical one, as this was the finding Pribyl's (1963, unpublished) study.
At the present time no theoretical explanation can be offered that will
adequately explain this f:i.nd:lng.

'l.'be hypothesis is presented mainly to

attempt to replieate the previously obtained results.

If hypothesis three

1s not supported, it will imply that the previous results were due to some
chance factor.
Hypothesis Four.

The HA judges in the non"interacting group situation

will initially be more reliable than the HA judges in the individual
situation.

In making many clinical judgments the HA judges in the individual

situation will become just as reliable as the HA judges in the group
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situation.

After an evell greater number of judgments, the IIA judges in the

individual situation will become less relia.ble than the HA judges in the
group situation.

In other words ~ HA judges in an individual situation are

at first less reliable, then as reliable, and then again less reliable than

UA judges in a group situation. a.ssuming that a fairly large number of
judgxaents are made.

Method
Subiec~s.

.All of the .§.S who particip:lted in the experiment were drawn

from the pool of .§.S maiutained at the Lake Sbore Campus of Loyola University.
There is a course requiremcr.t that all

~eneral

participate in five one-hour experiments.
d~

psychology students must

Since there are more

e~:periments

there are subject-hours available, the students have some leeway in

cltoosing the experiments they participate in.
As

a regular classroom exercise all of the uudergraduate general

psychology students took the MAS during the period of time between the
second and the fifth tf&eks of the semester.

The true-false !-tAS items were

included in a series of similar true-false items in a

personali~

naire innocuously titled the Biographical Inventory.

Two graduate assistants

(other than the
Inventory.

I> in

question-

the psychology department administered the Biographical

The students were told that the Biographical Inventory was being

adminis tered in order to standardize it.
Taylor (1953) has found that there is a consistent difference in the
meau MAS scores for males and females with the latter invariably scoring
higher.
same

Because of Ta.ylorts finding and the possibility that dtere may be

uru~nown

systecatic difference in performance of clinical judgment

tasks, only males wcre used in the experiment.
The male general psychology students whose scores on the MAS vere in
the highest 20 percent a.nd the lowest 20 percent were selected from a group
of more

~~an

sections.

80 males who were enrolled in four of the six general psychology

nle names of these students were put on a folder along with dbe

17

18

statement that they had been selected randomly for the experiment.

In accord

with the usual procedure for obtaining Is, the folder (having appointment
times in it) was passed around the four sections.

The I tested these 1s

individually.
The BA judges and LA judges for the non-interacting group condition
were selected on the basis of MAS scores from the distribution of HAS scores
of the 80 males in the remaining two general psychology sections held on
take Shore Campus.

As was true for the 1s in the individual condition, the

UA judges were those males with HAS scores in the top 20 percent of the
distribution and the LA judges were those males with MAS scores in the
lowest 20 percent of the distribution.

To make the group setting as natural

as possible, the expertment was run during the regular class period of the
two general psychololY sections.
students of both

secti~ns,

Data were collected from all of the

but only the data from the students selected on

the basis of their MAS scores were analyzed.
StimMli.

The stUauli were the 100 schizophrenics' vocabulary test

responses used by Hunt and Walker (1963).

These stimuli had previously

been standardized by experienced clinicians on a 7-point scale according to
the amount of exhibited disorganization (Hunt & Jones, 1962).
were presented in 10 sets consisting of 10 responses each.
tained two

st~uli

The stimuli

lach set con-

at each of the first three scale points and one stimulus

at each of the four remaining scale pOints of the 7-point scale used by the
clinicians.
Pros,dMre.

The Is in the individual condition were tested in one of
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the experimental booths at the Lake Shore Campus.

The

st~uli

were presented

by means of a projector on a screen approxtmately four feet away from the
The

I sat to the left of the 1 and behind him, at a table on which the pro-

jector rested.

The! called out his rating and the ! recorded it on a data

sheet like the one shown in Appendix A.
the

1.

After the experiment was completed

I asked each 1 the questions presented on the Questionnaire in Appendix L
The Is in the non-interacting group condition were given a data sheet

like the one shown in Appendix A.

They filled in their own responses.

At

the end of the experiment the data sheets were collected and the QuestionnaUa
passed out.

!he!s were asked to put their names on the Questionnaire (shown

in Appendix B) and to fill it out.
All !s received the same

instructi~ns.

!hey were told that their re-

sponses would be confidential and would not influence their standing in the
general psychology cour,se.

!hen the following instructions, taken from Hunt

and Walker (1963, p. 495) were read:
I~e are going to present you with a number of responses made
by schizophrenic patients to vocabulary test items taken from an
intelligence test. One of the ways in which the pathology of
schizophrenia may express itself is through disorganized thinking
which results in atypical, unusual, or 'abnormal' responses to
the items on such a test. !he qualitative interpretation by the
clinician of such test responses i8 one of the bases upon which
he may make a clinical or diagnostic interpretation. The extent
of the disorganization exhibited in these responses is not uniform. In some of the responses it is .in~l and others it is
extreme.

"You are asked to rate these responses on a 7-point scale,
from I through 7, according to the severity of the disorganization
exhibited in the response, with the low end of the scale representing .inteal disorlanization and the h1S! end of the seale representing maximal disorganization. In making these ratings we are
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asking you to concentrate upon the severity of the disorganization
exhibited in the response. In essence, what we are asking you to
do is to judge how 'schizophrenic' each response is. Some responses will seem quite normal; those you would rate '1'. Others
will be so disorganized as to require a '7' rating. !be majority
will fall somewhere in between.
liVe are now going to project onto the screen a stimulus word
and the response to it. think out your rating carefully, but as
soon as you make up your mind give your response.
"First you will be
any questions before we
ask questions after the
starts you will have to
experiment. 1 shall be
that time."

given three practice trials. Do you have
begin? You will have an opportunity to
practice trials, but once the experiment
hold all questions until the end of the
glad to answer any additional questions at

!ben three practice sttmuli were presented.

The ratings given by the

clinical psychologists were announced to the 1s as the appropriate slide was
presented.

At this time any questions were answered.

The ten trials were then presented.

In the non-interacting group

condition the stimuli were presented for approximately five seconds each.
Enough time was taken between sets to change the slide tray in the projector
and announce the number of the next set.

Por the !s run individually each

slide was presented only for the amount of time that it took the! to give
his rating.

Between sets the I simply changed the slide tray in the pro-

jector.
After the Questionnaire had been filled out the I answered any additional questions and requested that the 1s not discuss the experiment with
their friends.

R.esults
After all of the data were collected, data from Is who did not follow
directions or who knew about the experiment beforehand were eliminated.
After the above mentioned Is' data vere eliminated, theTe vere four groups
of 16 !s each.

The range of the MAS scores of the HA judges who performed

in the non-interacting group condition was from 23 to 38 while the range of
MAS scores for the HA judges performing in the individual condition was from
26 to 34.

The range of the MAS scores for the LA judges tested in class was

from 1 to 7 while the range for the LA judges tested individually was from
1 to 9.

The ranges of scores are quite comparable to previous research in

this area.
In the data analysis each Its

rati~gs

of each set of 10 stimuli were

correlated with the ratings for the same set of stimuli of each of the other
members of his group.
used.

Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient was

Each of the £'8 was converted into a A' value according to the table

presented by Edwards (1960).

Mean

&' values were then computed for each of

the four 16-member groups of !os on a set-by-set basis.
Duncan's new multiple range test was used to test the significance of
the differences between the means of the four groups on a set-by-set basis.
!be Duncan's range test was used to eliminate the spuriously large number
of significant! values that would be obtained if a single mean were used
in more than one comparison.

The set-by.set means and the results of the

range tee t are presented in Appendix C.

'!'he comparisons between the pairs

of means that are of interest in this study are presented in Table 1 and
21
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Table 2.

In all there are 60 possible combinations of pairings of two means

through all of the 10 range tests that were done.

Of the 60 comparisons,

there are three pairs of means that are significantly different at the .01
level and four pairs of means that are significantly different at the .05
level.

two of the pairs of means that are significantly different at the

.05 level and one of the pairs of means that is significantly different at
the .01 level were tlOt predicted by the hypotheses of this study.

Of the

40 pairings of means that are relevant to this study,

two

are significantly

different at the .05 level and two at the .01 level.

Since the protection

level against Type I errors for the Duncan's range test where all combinations of patrings of four means are tested at the .05 level is 86 percent,
the conclusions is that those differences that were found to be significant
were due primarily to chance.

!be protection level against Type 1 errors

for all combinations 0:' four means at the .01 level is 97 percent.

In this

case, too, one must conclude that the differences found were due to chance.

Table 1
Significance of Differences Between Mean Interjudge &eliabilities
for 16 High Anxious (HA) and 16 Low Anxious (LA)
1s in Group and. Ind.ividual Condi tiona
Individual

Group
HA

LA

LA

HA

Set

Meana

Meana

Meana

Meana

1

1.012

1.044

0.843

1.144

2

0.764

0.756

0.510

3

1.062

1.257

0.997

1.256

4

1.248

1.279

0.906

1.144

5

0.849

0.821

0.685

0.873

6

0.840

0.928

0.593

7

0.947

1.129

0.928

1.028

8

1.281

1.212

0.829

1.109

9

0.702

0.814

0.661

0.917

10

1.126

1.162

0.896

1.194

*

*If

0.932

1.042

aAll means are z' values
*Difference between means significant at .05 level according
to Duncan's new multiple range test.
**Difference between means significant at .01 level according
to Duncants new multiple range test.
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Table 2
Significance of Differences Between Mean Interjudge aeliabilities
for 1.6 High Anxious (HA) ~s in the Group (G) Condition and 16
SA 18 in the Individual (1) Condition and for 16 Low Anxious
(LA) ~s in the G Condition and 16 LA Is in the 1 Condition
Low Anxious

Iligh Anxious
G

I

G

I

Set

Mean

Mean

Mean

Mean

1

1.012

0.843

1.044

1.144

2

0.764

0.510

0.756

0.932

3

1.062

0.997

1.257

1.256

4

1.248

0.906

1.279

1.144

5

0.849

0.685

0.821

0.873

6

0.840

0.593

0.928

1.042

7

0.941

0.928

1.129

1.028

8

1.281

** 0.829

1.272

1.109

9

0.702

0.661

0.814

0.911

10

1.126

0.896

1.162

1.194

*

aAll means are s' values.
*Difference bett-reen means s1gni.ficant at .05 level according
to Duncan's new multiple range test.
**Difference betlreen means significant at .01 level according
to Duncan's new multiple ran.. test.
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A 2 x 2 x 10 analysis of variance was done on the data. the '!ariables

being level of anxiety. social situation. and sets of stimuli.
of this analysis are presented in Table 3.

.01 level are marked with an asterisk.

! for

anxiety~

The results

Values of I significant at the

The results indicate a significant

I being equal to 27.409 C..sg I and 60, p.<.Ol). Inspection of

Figure 1 shows that. in general, the main effect of a.m'..iety was due to the
greater reliability of L..<\ Jis.
The

I for social situation was 7.694 (sU 1 and 60, p.(.OI). While the

relationship is complex. the reliability of

~s

in the group situation is, in

general, significantly &reater than is the interjudge reliabilit1 in the
individual situation.

The interaction effect is also significant. 1. being

10.883 (gI 1 and 60, p.(.Ol).

~lis

indicates that Ule effect of the social

situation on clinical judgment is not independent of dle anxiety level of
the subject.

the effect of the 10 sets of sttmuli is significant at the .01 level,

l. being 53.778 W 9 and 540). This can be interpreted as being due to a
position effect or an item content effect.

ttle interaction between anxiety

and sets is not significant, indicating that reliability varies uniformly
over sets for both levels of anxiety.
The social situation by sets interaction is significant, I being 5.487
~

9 and

50~

p.<.Ol).

It appears that the fluctuation in interjudge relia-

bility from set to set is not independent of the social situation.
The I for the triple interaction. which takes into account the three
variables of anxiety level, social situation,

~nd

sets as influences on the

Table 3
Analysis of Variance of the .!. Values for the Mean
Interjudee Reliabilitics for the lour Groups of Subjects
~t.ml

Source of Variation

of

Squares

df

Mean
Square

r

Anxiety

4.687

1

4.687

27.409*

Social Situation

1.308

1

1.308

7.649*

Anxiety x Social Situation

1.861

1

1.961

10.883*

Irror <a>

10.245

60

.171

B Sets

15.004

9

1.667

.416

9

.046

1.484

1.528

9

.170

5.487*

.777

9

.863

27.839*

16.620

540

.031

52.446

639

Anxiety x Sets
Social Situation x Sets
Anxiety x Social Situation x Sets
Error

(1))

Total

*p is at 1% or less
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53.778*
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3
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Fig. 1.

0

f Stimuli

Mean interjudge!reliability (in

~'

values) on a set-by-set basis.

interjudge reliability of the sut)jects.
than chance.

1 t,eing

27.839

<.2:

This) too, is significantly larger

9 and 540, p. <.01) •

when these three variables exist in

Em

this resul t li.teans that

experiment) they do not act inde-

pendently.
The fluctuations from set to set in reliability over all judges led to
a postdiction that the sets of stimuli might in themselves be of varying

difficulty for the naive judges.

To test this postdiction the me.an standard

deviations of the clinicians that originally standardized the stimuli were
computed on a set-by-set basis.

The clinicians' mean standard deviations

from the ratings obtained in the standardization were taken as an index of
difficulty.

-

These standard deviation scores and the mean z' values for all

four groups were graphed on the same grid on a. set-by-set basis.

This is

presented in Figure 2.
If the postdiction were to be supported. the IlleBn clinicia.n standard
deviation should be low when the naive judges' interjudge reliability is
high.

This relationship holds only when going from trial 4 to 5, from 6 to

7, possibly from 8 to 9, and from 9 to 10.

!t must be noted that in

constructing the graph, the units for the two scales were not equated.
However, no desirable transformation would change the order of the variables.
Apparently the changes in interjudge reliability from set to set cannot be
interpreted solely as a function of differential difficulty of the sets.
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Fig. 2. Mean interjudge reliabilities (in z' values) of the four experimental groups combined for each set of stinmli and the mean standard deviations
of the clinicians' ratings of each set of stinmli.

Discussion
Contrary to the predictions of hypothesis one, the SA judges in the
individual condition did not show an initial decrement in reliability.

This

result is not in agreement with the previous research of Hunt and Blumberg
(1961) and Hunt and Walker (1963) who found that HA. judges were less reliable
than LA judges on the initial trial in three independent studies.
Because this initial decrement for HA Is was not found, the present
study fails to support the Bunt and Walker (1963) hypothesis that SA judges
had more of what Child (1954) called tltask irrelevant responses" due to
anxiety than did LA judges.

!heoretically SA Is should have done worse at

first and then, once the task irrelevant responses were eliminated, should
have performed on a par with the LA Is.
!hat the expected result did not occur is surprising since the stimuli
and methodology used replicated the Bunt and Walker (1963) study exactly.
One can only guess that perhaps some unknown selection factor resulted in

differing populations for the two studies or that some ! variable influenced
the results.
Since the Hunt and Walker study was done at Northwestern University and
the present study at Loyola University, some unknown selection factor may
have been a critical variable.

Iven if the two populations are similar, it

is still possible that one or the other sample was biased in some unknown
direction.
that an experimenter variable influenced the results is also a tenable
hypothesis since the amount of stress in a given experiment could be related
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to I characteristics.

(&osenthAI, 1964).

!he second hypothesis predicted

that in a group situation there would be no difference in performance of BA
and LA subjects on any trials.

!his hypothesis was confirmed.

Its theo-

retical relevance is, however, limited by the lack of support of hypothesis
one since it adds no support to the Walker et al. (in press) assumption dhat
the group testing condition is less stressful.
Spence (1963) suggests that the amount of task irrelevant responses is
a function of the amount of stress in the experimental condition.

If the

assumption of the group condition being less stressful than the individual
condition were correct, the differential amount of task irrelevant responses
of HA and LA judges should be greater in the individual condition.

the

negative results of hypothesis one of this study indicate that either the
assumption of differential stress for group and individual condition is
invalid or that Spence's (1963) concept of task irrelevant responses being
a function of stress is invalid.

It is impossible to indicate from the

results which is the case.
Hypothesis three predicted no difference for LA!s on the first trial
as a result of individual or group testing.

As was the case with hypothesis

two, this finding of no difference is not theoretically relevant since its
importance depended on finding a significant difference between BA and LA
Is on the first trial of the individual condition.
It was predicted by hypotheses three and four tbat both BA and LAjs
in the individual situation would have a relatively poorer performance on
later trials.

The same variables that influenced the failure of the results
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to support hypothesis one may well have been critical determinants here.
Since the Pribyl (1963) finding had no foundation in theory it is now
even more probable that it was no more than a chance result.

On

the other

hand, it should not be dismissed too lightly in view of the fact that random
groups of 1s participated itl Pribyl's study, while in the present study
highly selected

Is (HA and LA) participated in the individual and group

condi tions •
In hypothesis four the ItA judges in the individual condition were
assumed to be in a more stressful experimental situation than the HA judges
in the group condition.

This was apparently not the case as there was no

difference found in the initial trials of the two conditions for the HA
judges.

It was thought that HA judges in the individual condition would

show more task irrelevant responses than HA judges in the group condition
because of less stress in the latter condition.

Either Spence (1963) is not

correct in her assumption that task irrelevant responses are a function of
the amount of stress, or there was insufficient stress in the individual
condition.

It is difficult to choose

be~een

these two explanations as

previous research did not directly test hypotheses relating clinical
judgment and the effects of testing 1s :tn

grlJltpS

and individually.

Although no predictions were made concerning the analysis of variance,
these results are nevertheless :tnteresting.
that the

One finding of importance is

1s in the group condition were more reliable than the 1s in the

individual condition.

This result lends support to the applicability of

Hunt's (1959) analogy of psychophysics and

~linical

judgment since it agrees
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with findings of Allport (1920, 1924) using judgments of sensory stimuli.

He

found that sensory judgments made in a co-acting but non-interacting group
were less extreme than if the judgments were made alone.
!he reliability measure used in this study tells essentially how well
the .§.S agree with each other.

The higher the reliability the more alike are

all the .§.S judgments of ct18 stimuli.

Allport (1920 t 1924) also made obser-

vations somewhat parallel to the results of this study; these indicate that
.§.8 in the group condition were more reliable than 1s in the individual con-

dition.

He noticed that .§.s' free associations were more common or less

idiosyncratic if they were made in a co-acting but non-interacting group.
This parallel further pOints out the generality of phenomena that take place
in clinical judgment.
When all of the LA.§.s were combined, they were found to be more reliable
than the HA 1s.

One very speculative explanation for this might be that the

HA 1s did make some task irrelevant responses that were not dissipated as the
trials progressed.

This is quite possible since new

st~uli

were presented

on every set, and it may be that HA !8 made task irrelevant responses to
specific stimuli as they were presented.

These responses may have been

small enough in number to produce non-significant results in the Duncan's
test of mean differences, but their cumulative effect on the performance of
HAls could have been picked up by the more sensitive! test.
'l'he finding that

~ere

was a good deal of variance contributed by the

sets of stimuli and the finding that the amount of variance was not uniform
for the group and individual conditions suggest that sets of stimuli used in
~--

,- Tr·
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clinical

jud~nt

studies should be standardized under these conditions.

Situational and individual difference variables are proving to be very
tmportant in clinical judgment and future research must take these into
account.

SUDIIII8ry
Previous research has shown that the relative performance of high
anxious (HA) and low anxious (LA) 1s (operationally defined by extreme scores
on the Taylor MlS) on the initial trials of clinical jud,..nts is different
depending whether the HA and LA Is judged in a croup or individually.

In

this study the 1s were given the juclgmental task. of rating the amount of
confusion exhibited in 100 vocabulary test responses taken schizophrenics'
test protocols.

The 1s rated the stimuli in ten trials or sets consisting

of 10 stimuli each.

Because of previous research HA 1s were expected to

perform less well than LA 1s on the first trial when the !,s judged indi ..
vidually.

!hie expectation was not born out.

When HA Is and LA

Is worked

in a croup there was no difference in performance as expected, but since a
differential effect due to working in a group or individually was predicted
the tmplicatlons of this finding are limited.

Further hypothese. predicting

a decrement in performance for both BA and LA l' judging individually on
later trials were presented and tested but not supported.

The lack. of

replication of previous research was discussed in terms of differing subject
populations and I variables.

For exploratory purposes an analysis of

variance was done on the .I' values of the mean interjudge rel1abllities,
(easentially, a measure of how well the judges acreed with each other) t the
variables being level of anxiety (IA or LA), social situation (group or
individual condition), and aets of attmuli.

It revealed that clinical

juds-enta, like sensory judsments, tend to be more alike (better interjudge
agreement) 1f the 1s judge in a group than 1f the 1s juclge individually.
3S

3.6

this latter finding suggests that many of the characteristics of clinical
judgment may be similar to those found in other types of judgment.
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Appendix A

Name
Trial I

Trial II

Trial III

Trial IV

Trial V

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

4

I.

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

6

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

7

8

8

3

3

8

9

9

9

9

9

10

10

10

10

10

'trial VI

Trial VII

Trial VIII

Trial IX

Trial X

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

4

5

5

5

5

5

6

6

6

6

6

7

7

7

7

7

8

8

8

8

8

9

9

9

9

9

10

10

10

10

10
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Appendix B

Questionnaire
1. Did you know anything about thir; experiment be::orehand?

Yes

-----

No

2. If you did know anything about this experiment beforehand, 'What did you

know about it"

3. Did you understand what you were expected to do:'

Yes

No _ _ __

4. 1 f the answer to the pr.evious quae don was no, t.,ma t didn't you understand"

5. Please comment below on the (!..,,<periment or any of the above queStiO'l.16.
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Appendix C

Duncan'a Wew Multiple Range teat Applied to the Differencea
Provided by All Combinations of the Mean lnt:erjudge
&eliabilitie. for All Pour Experimental
Groups on a Set-by-Set Basia
Heans

Set.
1
2

BAl-

JIAGb

LAGc

LAId

0.843

1.012

1.044

1.144

HAl

l.AG
6

o,zr;.

0.12

0.510
3
4
S

6

HAG

HAl

HAG

tAl

LAG

0,997

1.062

1.256

1.257

HAl

LAI

HAG
1 1 248

1.279

1:1!4

HAl

LAG

0.685

0.821

HAl

HAG

LAG

LA!

0.%0

0.928

1.Q42

•

HAG

tAl

0,849

0.873

lit

8
9

10

tAG

0.906

0.593
7

LAI

0.9 32

**

HAl

HAG

LAI

0.928

0.947

.1.028

LAG

1.129

HAl

LAl

LAG

HAG

0.829

1.109

1.272

1.281

l.AG
0.814

tAl
0.9 11

It,

HAl

BAG

0.661

0.702

HAl

HAG

LAG

1.126

1 1 162

Oz826

W

1.194

Note ...-All means are .It values. Any two means not underlined by the same line are significantly different. Any two
means underlined by the .ame line are not significantly different.
&sigh Anxious Individual (11-16)
bHigh Anxious Group (1-16)
cLow Anxious Group (N-16)
dLow Anxious Individual (1.16)
*Significant at ,OS level
**Signlficant at .01 level
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